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COPYRIGHT LAW-Tenth Circuit Application of the
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test to Determine the
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs:
A utoskill v. National Educational Support Systems*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A utoskill Inc. v. National EducationalSupport Systems, Inc.,I provides
a method that allows federal courts to determine which elements within
a computer software system are copyrightable. The Autoskill method may
enable courts to better determine whether copyright protected elements
of computer software have been infringed by other software. 2
Since its commercial debut in 1959,1 the integrated circuit or "chip"
has fostered an incredible array of new information technologies from
personal computers to cellular phones. Over the years, the law regarding
computer software has struggled to keep up with the developing technology. As a result of this rapid explosion, Congress decided to avoid
grappling with each new legislative issue regarding information technology
that required more study than the legislative process was willing to give.4
Accordingly, Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, which froze the
law on a variety of issues and left responsibility for exploring and
formulating policy regarding the intersection of copyrights and computers
to the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU). 5 Four years later, Congress passed the Computer Software Ac based on CONTU's recommendations that the idea-expression
dichotomy should be applied to computer programs. The idea-expression
dichotomy is based on 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 7 Protection under section 102(b)

* Entry in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992) [hereinafter Autoskill 1], aff'd, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.

1993) [hereinafter Autoskillll], cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992)
[hereinafter Gates Rubber 1], rev'd sub nom., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d
823 (10th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Gates Rubber Il] (adopting the Autoskill court's method for
determining the scope of copyright infringement).
3. T.R. REm, THE Cm, 96 (1985).
4. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. Rv. 977, 979 (1993).
5. Id.
6. Computer Software Act, § 10(b) Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (1988)) (revising the scope of copyright protection for computer software to reflect CONTU's
recommendations).
7. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102(b) (West Supp. 1994) (dichotomy affording copyright protection only to expression, not ideas).
See also Financial Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity Builders, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (D.
Kan. 1992) (stating copyright protection extends to expression but never to ideas).
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is divided into two forms: (1) works of expression are granted protection8
by copyright law; and (2) ideas are potentially protected by patent law.

Even before the introduction of copyright law to computer software,

the courts struggled with the difficult task of distinguishing ideas from
the expression of ideas. The courts have often decided the idea-expression

distinction on an ad hoc basis. 9 Nevertheless, in the field of computer
software, various tests have been developed to aid the courts in applying
the idea-expression dichotomy as a test for substantial similarity in copyright infringement actions.

0

This Note addresses the holding of the

district court in Autoskill I, the holding of the United States Court of

Appeals in Autoskill II, and -the various tests used by other courts to
determine substantial similarity of computer software. Finally, this Note
analyzes the Autoskill cases with respect to their impact on existing case
law and policy.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1986, Autoskill Inc. (Autoskill), a Canadian corporation with its

principal place of business in Ottawa, Canada, obtained a registration
certificate of United States copyright for a computer program designed
to teach students with reading disabilities." Four years later, National
8. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) ("Novelty of the art or thing described or
explained has nothing to do with the validity of copyright . .. [t]hat is the provence of [patent
law,] not of copyright.").
9. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
10. "To prove copyright infringement a plaintiff is required to show: (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Autoskill 11, 994
F.2d at 1487 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1296 (1991)).
See, e.g., Gates Rubber 11, 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 1993); Allied Materials and Equip. Co. v.
Pappa Geppetto's Toys Victoria, Ltd., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1862, 1864 (D. Kan. 1993).
In order to prove copying, the second element of infringement, the plaintiff may use either direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence by demonstrating that defendant had access to the protected
work and by demonstrating a substantial similarity between the two works. Autoskill II, 994 F.2d
at 1489; see also Gates Rubber 11, 9 F.3d 823, 832 (10th Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Financial Control Assocs. v. Equity
Builders, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1115 (D. Kan. 1992).
11. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1559. Copyright ownership is vested initially in the author of
the work, the party who creates the work by translating an idea into a fixed tangible expression.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a). The owner of copyright has exclusive rights to authorize the following: 1)
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies; 2) produce derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work; 3) distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993).
The Autoskill II court held that National Education Support Systems (NESS) did not present
sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that Autoskill owned the copyright. Autoskill II,
994 F.2d at 1487-88 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 410(c), which provides that a certificate of registration
establishes the validity of copyright and shifts the burden to dispute the validity to the party
challenging it). The document bearing Autoskill's assignment of the program's ownership rights
from the programming firm was presented to the court in the interim between the end of trial and
before the trial court's decision. Brief for Appellee at 48 n.40, Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ.
Support Sys., Inc., 944 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2118). Prior to locating the assignment
document, the President of Autoskill, Dr. Trites, testified at a hearing to the existence of a document
assigning ownership rights of the program to Autoskill. Id. at A54. Thus, Dr. Trites' testimony
was admitted into evidence as proof of Autoskill's ownership. Id. On the other hand, NESS sought
to prove that Autoskill could not have claimed ownership under the common law of agency test
for copyright law regardless of a document of ownership. Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1488-89.
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Educational Support Systems (NESS), a New Mexico corporation with
its principal place of business in Albuquerque, New Mexico, began marketing a program similar to that of Autoskill.' 2 Autoskill sued NESS for
copyright infringement in the New Mexico District Court and moved for
a preliminary injunction against NESS. 3
The district court in Autoskill I granted Autoskill a preliminary injunction covering those portions of Autoskill's program that the court
deemed protectable by copyright.4 The court divided the allegedly copied
Autoskill program into various elements as related to their function within
the program." The court then employed a method of analysis to determine
which of the copyright protected elements of the Autoskill program were
infringed upon by NESS.' 6 In general, the method employed by the
district court filtered out idea and non-protectable expression from those
elements of expression worthy of copyright protection, similar to the
process of separating gravel from sand by filtering it through a series
of sieves. The critical issue addressed by the Autoskill I court was whether
this method of analysis sufficiently distinguished idea from expression
such that the substantial similarity requirement of an infringement action
was met.' 7 Based on its method of analysis, the Autoskill I court held
that there was a substantial likelihood that NESS's program infringed
on the Autoskill program. 8 As a result of the Autoskill I holding, NESS
appealed more than thirty days after the relief of preliminary injunction
was ordered, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 9
12. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1559. Lynn Beckwith, the head of the firm that wrote NESS's
software, testified that NESS instructed him that the software was "to be like Autoskill" and was
to be an "Autoskill replacement." Id.
13. For copyright infringement, the 10th Circuit allows a district judge to grant a preliminary
injunction if the moving party demonstrates:
(1)Substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on the merits [in
Autoskill's case, a reasonable probability that Autoskill will ultimately be entitled
to the relief sought. See also Financial Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity Builders,
Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D. Kan, 1992)]; (2) a showing that the movant will
suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) proof that the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
the opposing party; and (4) a showing that the injunction, if issued, would not be
adverse to the public interest.
AutoskillII, 994 F.2d at 1487.
14. Autoskill 1, 793 F. Supp. at 1573.
15. Id. at 1566.
16. Id. at 1566-70.
17. See Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1565-66 (test for substantial similarity as applied to computer
programs was without precedent in the Tenth Circuit).
18. Id. at 1569.
19. Autoskil II, 994 F.2d at 1484-85. Procedurally, NESS failed to file notice of appeal within
the 30-day period after the order of relief was entered as required for all civil cases in federal
court under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 1483-8; see also FED. R. App. P.
4(a). NESS, however, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition six days after the district court entered
the preliminary injunction. Auloskill I, 994 F.2d at 1482. Subsequently, NESS's appeal was upheld
because it was filed within the 60-day period beginning from the day of commencement of Chapter
II bankruptcy as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1482-83. NESS
was allowed standing under § 108(b)(2) because it filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition six days
after the district court in Autoskill I entered an order for a preliminary injunction. Id. Specifically,
the United States Court of Appeals in Autoskill I held "that under § 108(b) NESS was required
to file notice of appeal 'before the later of either': (1) the period provided by the applicable
nonbankruptcy law or (2) '60 days after the order for relief [under bankruptcy law]."' Id. at 1484.
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In A utoskill II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order for the preliminary injunction
against NESS. 20 The Autoskill I court concluded that NESS had not
demonstrated any reversible error in the district court's copyright infringement analysis in Autoskill 1.21 The Autoskill II court addressed three
issues of critical importance to the outcome of the dispute: First, whether
BankNESS's activities were within the scope of section 108(b)(2) of the
22
second,
appeal;
of
notice
filing
for
allowance
the
out
ruptcy Code setting
whether Autoskill's independently contracted programmers were employees
of Autoskill under the relevant factors of the common law agency meaning
of ownership; 23 and third, whether the district court judge in Autoskill I
properly concluded that Autoskill satisfied its burden on the substantial
similarity requirement 24 for a preliminary injunction.
III.

SURVEY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
SOFTWARE

The Autoskill II court affirmed the district court's holding that Autoskill, as a copyright holder, satisfied its burden of showing substantial
25
similarity and thus the issuance of a preliminary injunction was correct.
Moreover, the district court had "used a permissible method of analysis
and reached a reasonable conclusion.' '26 The discussion below outlines
the Autoskill method for determining substantial similarity. This discussion
begins with a survey of three common methods of determining substantial
similarity: the Ninth Circuit test from Sid & Marty Krofft Television v.
McDonald's Corp.,27 the Third Circuit test from Whelan Associates v.

20. Autoskil II, 994 F.2d at 1499.
21. Id. at 1493.
22. Only two other courts have addressed the issue of whether § 108(b)(2) extends the time for
filing a notice of appeal for 60 days after the order of relief is entered. Autoskill I, 994 F.2d at
1483 n.3 (citing Production Credit Ass'n v. Burk, 427 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (N.D. 1988); DiMaggio
v. Blanche, 466 So. 2d 489, 490-91 (La. Ct. App. 1985)). Without any precedent in the Tenth
Circuit regarding the application of § 108(b), the Autoskill I court permitted NESS to file appeal
because it was within the 60-day period beginning from the day Chapter 11 was filed as provided
in § 108(b). Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1482. Autoskill ll's rationale for applying § 108(b) was based
on the legislative intent to afford better time to protect the interests of the bankruptcy estate during
the litigation process. Id. at 1485.
23. NESS had argued that Autoskill could not claim ownership of the disputed program because
it was written by independent contractors who were not technically "work made for hire" employees
of Autoskill under the agency test outlined in Community for a Creative Non-violence v. Reid.
Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1488 (quoting Community for a Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 731 (1989)). Moreover, NESS argued that the Reid agency test adopted in 1989 should be
applied retroactively to the Autoskill program created in 1986. Autoskill 11, 994 F.2d at 1488 (quoting
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2447-48 (1991)). See, e.g., Independence
One Mortgage v. Wicks, 5 F.3d 1372, 1373 (10th Cir. 1993). The Autoskill H court agreed that
the Reid test should have applied retroactively to Autoskill; however, the evidence was not sufficient
enough to rebut Autoskill's presumption of ownership to reverse the preliminary injunction. Autoskil II,
994 F.2d at 1488-89.
24. See supra note 10.
25. Autoskill 11, 994 F.2d at 1499.
26. Id. at 1492.
27. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,2 and the Second Circuit test from
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.29 Krofft is the
traditional test for substantial similarity, but has never wholly been applied
to computer software; 0 Altai and Whelan are the two leading tests on
the subject of computer software copyright. Finally, after addressing these
cases, this Note discusses the Autoskill potential impact on copyright law
in terms of developing a workable methods test for substantial similarity.
A.

The Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp. Test
The traditional test for substantial similarity in copyright law is the
"total concept and feel" test from Sid & Marty Krofft Television v.
McDonald's Corp.3' The test consists of an "extrinsic test" and an
"intrinsic test." '3 2 The extrinsic test simply allows the trier of fact to
determine substantial similarity by analyzing a list of specific criteria,
such as comparing subject matter, artwork and setting. 3 The intrinsic
test asks whether an ordinary reasonable person can determine if an
allegedly infringing work has captured the "total look and feel" of a
copyright protected work.3 In general, the "total concept and feel test"
is ideal for visual forms of expression, such as greeting cards and the
audiovisual work of arcade games, but is discouraged in the complex
literal works environment of computer programming. 35
B.

The Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory Test
Whelan was one of the first copyright cases to fully address the scope
of substantial similarity in computer software. In Whelan, the plaintiff

28. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
29. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
31. Sid & Marty Krofft Television, 562 F.2d at 1167. In Krofft, plaintiffs brought a copyright
infringement action of the children's television show "H.R. Pufnstuf" against defendant upon
production of defendant's "McDonaldland" commercials. Id. at 1160-62. The Ninth Circuit in
Krofft compared several characterizing aspects of both parties, such as the physical appearances of
McDonaldland's "Mayor McCheese" character with Krofft's "Pufnstuf" character. Id. at 1166-67.
Krofft held that "duplication or near identity is not necessary to establish infringement" but such
that the McDonaldland commercials "have captured the 'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf
show." Id. at 1167.
32. Id. at 1164.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 3 MELVILLE B. NimMER & DAvm NIMMER, N

R ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1992).

See

also Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619-20 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) ("total concept and feel" test strictly applied to the audiovisual
display of a video arcade game); Gates Rubber I, 798 F. Supp. at 1510-20 (where the court partly
incorporated the "total concept and feel" test in its analysis of computer software); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455-65 (N.D. Ga. 1987)
(test as applied to computer screen displays generated by a computer program); E.F. Johnson Co.
v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 n.16 (D. Minn. 1985) (discussing the difficulties
influenced in applying the "total concept and feel" test to complicated computer programs that
are "well hidden from public view"). In Autoskill I, the court rejected the Krofft test because it
would only be helpful if the fact finder actually operated the programs rather than relying on expert
testimony and because Autoskill's reading program appeared to the court to be far too complex
for the simplistic "look and feel" analysis. Autoskill 1, 793 F. Supp. at 1571.
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retained a copyright to an office management program for a dental
laboratory and, subsequently, the defendant was allowed to use the
program.3 6 The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement when the defendant began selling a program with functional and structural parts
(non-literal elements) similar to the plaintiff's 37program but written in a
different computer language (literal elements). The Whelan court held
that copyright protection may extend beyond literal elements of a program
to include non-literal elements such as "structure, sequence and organization. ' ' 38 To determine whether the two computer programs were substantially similar, the Whelan court applied39the idea-expression dichotomy
based on the opinion of Baker v. Selden.
In Baker, the Supreme Court held that some types of expression along
with ideas were not suitable for copyright protection.4 From the holding
of Baker, the Whelan court formulated a general rule to better distinguish
expression from idea: "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea [thus not copyrightable] and everything that
is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression
of the idea [and copyrightable]." ' 4' In addition to the general rule, the
Whelan court also introduced two corollary factors to be used in distinguishing expression from idea: (1) the sc~nes d faire doctrine; and (2)
the merger doctrine.42 The scones e faire doctrine excludes copyright
protection for those elements that are unoriginal or are standard or
common to a particular topic, 43 such as ordinary phrases." When de-

termining whether an element lacks originality with respect to scnes i
faire, however, it is also important to recognize the very low threshold
of originality accorded by the courts. 45 The merger doctrine, on the other
hand, excludes an element of expression from copyright protection if

36. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226-27.
37. Id. Non-literal elements may, for example, refer to functional elements of a program, like
the audiovisual displays on the computer screen, or may refer to the way a program is analyzed
to accomplish a certain sequence of events, such as when to ask a computer user for information.
On the other hand, literal elements refer to the language used to program a computer, such as
Fortran, Pascal and Basic. See Digital Communications Assocs., Int'l v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 454-56 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
38. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248.
39. Id.at 1235-36 (discussing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
40. 101 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1879). In addition to ideas, the Supreme Court in Baker held that
certain types of expression were not copyrightable. Id. From this holding, the Whelan court concluded
that copyright protection should be denied to anything that is necessary to the idea ("purpose or
function") of the computer program. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
41. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
42. Id. at 1236-37.
43. See Autoskill 11, 994 F.2d at 1494; 3 NtAtaR, supra note 35, § 13.03[B].
44. See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989) (Ordinary phrases such as
"rekindle old memories" cannot be protected by copyright.).
45. See Toro Co. v. R. & R. Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986). In copyright
law, originality requires that the work is independently created by the author and that the work
possesses a minimal degree of creativity. Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1495 n.23. For example, the
Autoskili II court held that entering data in the Autoskill program with the 1, 2 and 3 keys on
the computer keyboard sufficiently satisfied a minimal degree of creativity. Id.
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that element has merged inseparably with an idea." In sum, Whelan
provided a test that recognizes infringement of both non-literal and literal
forms of expression for computer programs and introduced the doctrines
of scenes a faire and merger to the field of computer software. Thus,
under the Whelan test, structural aspects of a computer program may
be infringed without any copying of the program's literal code. 47
C.

The Computer Assocociates v. Altai Test
The Altai court discovered a critical flaw in the Whelan test in that
once the single ultimate idea within a computer program can be identified
and separated, everything left over must be expression. This approach
erroneously ignores the many levels of idea within a given program."
On the other hand, Altai suggested that infringement analysis must address
several levels of idea and expression within a single computer program.
Altai recognized that a copyright does not protect every element in a
work. 49 The Altai court, consequently, created a three-step test to separate
non-protectable expression and idea from protectable expression by dissecting constituent elements of the allegedly copied program.
1. Step 1: Abstraction-Separating Idea from Expression
The first level of analysis used in Altai was the "abstractions" test.5 0
The abstractions test consists of breaking an allegedly copied program
into its functional parts and then identifying "levels of abstraction" in
increasing order of generality from the lowest level, such as the internal
details of the program or code, to the highest level, such as the ultimate

46. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
("When the idea and its expression are . . . inseparable, copying the expression in such circumstances
would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations
imposed by patent law."); see also Autoskill I, 994 F.2d at 1494 (discussing merger doctrine).
47. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233-34.
48. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 3
NIMMER, supra note 35, § 13.03[F] [sic] wrongly cited in case; should be at 13.48.33). The Whelan
court found the one ultimate idea underlying the computer program and designated everything else
a copyrightable expression. Id.
49. Altai, 982 F.2d at 721. Where the Whelan court made one division of idea from expression,
Altai suggests there are many opportunities or "levels" within a single program allowing for separation
of idea from expression. Id.; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 49 U.S.
340, 349 (1991).
50. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-07 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1930)). In Nichols, Judge Learned Hand stated:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at
times might consist only of its title, but there is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected since otherwise the [author] could prevent the
use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
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function or idea of the program."' The abstractions test is merely a tool
elements of a program but does not
for determining the protectable
52
identify the elements per se.

2. Step 2: Filtration-Separating Protectable from Non-Protectable
Expression.
The second level of analysis seeks to define the scope of plaintiff's
copyright by subjecting the levels of abstraction to a filtering method
which separates the protectable expression from the non-protectable el-

ements.53 One could consider each factor, such as the scnes d faire
doctrine or material from the public domain, to be like an individual
filter within a series of filters through which expression flows. With each
filtering factor introduced, non-protectable expression is filtered out leaving protectable expression as an end product. Filtration should at least
eliminate unprotectable elements of ideas, scenes tfaire material, public

domain material, merger material, process, facts, and other unprotectable
54
expression dictated by the facts of the program in question.

3. Step 3: Comparison
After being subjected to the process of elimination by the filtration

test, a court in this final step compares the core of creative expression

of the allegedly infringing program with the core of creative expression
of the copyright protected program to determine whether they are substantially similar." Thus, "to impose liability for copyright infringement,
the court must find that the defendant copied protectable elements of
the plaintiff's program and that the protectable elements comprise a

substantial part of the plaintiff's program when it is considered as a
whole.

' '5 6

During this phase of the substantial similarity analysis, the

51. Altai, 982 F.2d at 705 (quoting 3 NU.BMR, supra note 35, § 13.03[F] [sic] (cited wrong in
case; should be at 13-78.34); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp.
37, 60-62 (D. Mass. 1990) (In general, those elements at a higher level of abstraction constitute
ideas and those at the lower level constitute expression. The abstractions test calls for casting out
the "higher levels of abstraction" or ideas and leaving only the expression of the program).
52. Application of the abstractions test varies with the particular facts of each case. In general,
however, the computer program may be divided into six levels of decreasing abstraction: 1) the
program's main purpose; 2) the program's structure or architecture; 3) various abstract data types
(a list of associated operations, such as entering, deleting, finding or sorting a check number from
a list of checks); 4) algorithms and data structures (sequence of events necessary to accomplish an
operation, such as the operation of entering check numbers into the list of checks may include
creating a computer screen asking for data or storing it); 5) source code (program set in a programming
language, e.g. Fortran); 6) object code (actual machine instructions, e.g. *binary). See John W. L.
Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer ProgramParts Under LearnedHand'sAbstractions Test in Software
Copyright Cases, 91 MIcH. L. Rav. 526, 533 (1992).
53. Altai, 982 F.2d at 705.
54. Gates Rubber II, 9 F.3d 823, 833 (10th Cir. 1993).
55. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710-11 (the judge will take the copyrightable end product of the copyrightprotected program and compare it with the similar elements found within the allegedly infringing
program).
56. Gates Rubber II, 9 F.3d 823, 833 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Autoskill 11, 994 F.2d 1476, 149698 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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Altai court recognized some need for expert opinion to ascertain substantial similarity of computer software, "an often highly complicated
and technical subject matter. '5 7 The court, however, left the extent of
expert testimony allowed in a given case to the discretion of the trial
court.5
In short, the three-part Altai test allows individual program elements,
that may have been excluded from protection at one level of abstraction,
the possibility of copyright protection when in combination with other
elements at another level of abstraction. 59 The Altai court also cautioned
that the test should not be mechanically applied. 6o Thus, the court recommended considering the congressional intent of promoting science and
the useful arts by allowing for broad copyright protection before applying
any overly narrowing set of factors into the abstraction-filtration-com6
parison analysis . 1
Krofft, Whelan and Altai characterize the prevailing case law before
Autoskill. Over the years, the Whelan test has been criticized by courts
and commentators alike. 62 On the other hand, the Altai three-part test
provides the courts with the necessary flexibility for the complex substantial similarity analysis of computer software. 63 Although the Krofft
test has been successfully applied in many other fields of copyright law,
the courts have been reluctant to fully apply Krofft to computer software. 64
Hence, one can see that the application of copyright law to the field of
computer software has not yet matured, and new cases such as Autoskill
contribute significantly to this developing field of jurisprudence. 65
IV.

ANALYSIS OF A UTOSKILL v. NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL
SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Autoskill provides a new method of applying the idea-expression dichotomy to the area of computer software. Moreover, Autoskill's method

57. Altai, 982 F.2d at 713.
58. Id. The Altai court recognized the need for the trier of fact to make a well-informed
judgment at the comparison step with expert opinion regarding the degree of substantial similarity
between the copyrightable end product of the allegedly infringing program and the similar elements
found within the copyright-protected program.
59. See Miller, supra note 4 at 1001-03 (comparing the Whelan test where only one idea-expression
distinction is made with Altai where several idea-expression distinctions are made).
60. Altai, 982 F.2d at 712. The Altai court was concerned with the tendency of subjecting a
program to too many levels of filtration and, in effect, narrowing the level of copyright protection.
Id.
61. It should be noted that the Second Circuit three-step analysis of Altai (December 17, 1992)
was not yet reported at the time of the Autoskill I opinion (April 21, 1992). Therefore, the threestep analysis of Autoskill I was derived independently from the Second Circuit Altai analysis. However,
the Altai analysis was reported such that it was a primary reference in the Autoskill II opinion
(May 19, 1993). See Autoskill I, 994 F.2d at 1490 n.17.
62. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992). See generally supra text
accompanying note 48.
63. See AutoskillII, 994 F.2d 1476, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993).
64. 3 MELVI.LE B. NMMER & DAVID N MIER, N
R oN CoPx uGH §13.03 (1992). See generally
supra text accompanying note 35.
65. See Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1494.
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of determining substantial similarity satisfies the policy considerations of
copyright law set forth by Congress.
In Autoskill I, the court incorporated portions of the Whelan analysis
and even more of the Altai analysis. The courts in Autoskill, like Altai,
rejected Whelan's simplistic general rule that a computer program consists
6
of one major idea rather than of many different levels of ideas. Nevertheless, Autoskill employed some aspects of the Whelan analysis, par67
ticularly the corollary doctrines of scenes a faire and merger, as well
as the use of exhibits and lay evidence in the determination of substantial
similarity.

68

Using scones a faire doctrine, the court in Autoskill I filtered out some
common non-protectable techniques used in reading programs, such as
"silent sentence and paragraph" components found within the Autoskill
program.69 In discussing the merger doctrine, the court introduced two
fundamental concepts of copyright law to its analysis. 70 First, an expression
cannot be protected if the underlying idea can be expressed in a limited
number of ways. 7' Second, an expression is not protected if it is found
to be dictated by the nature of the idea.7 2 Thus, the court found that
thirteen categories of vowel and consonant combinations used in the
Autoskill program must be filtered out of the analysis because the categories are merged to the idea of testing and training students in letter
and sound relationships in the English language and therefore can only
be expressed in a limited number of ways. 7 3 In sum, although Autoskill I
did not follow the Whelan test in its entirety, the court did adopt some
important aspects of the Whelan analysis.
Although the Autoskill I court was influenced by some aspects of
Whelan, Autoskill 's analysis primarily resembles the later three-step

66. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. 1557, 1566 (D.N.M. 1992). In Altai, an expert witness described
the major pitfalls of the Whelan test's failure to recognize that the computer science terms of
"structure", "sequence" and "organization" of a computer program are not synonymous. Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Thus, the Whelan test
failed to recognize the many complex levels of idea and expression rather than just one idea that
may be found within a program. Id. at 559.
67. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1567-68.
68. Id. at 1569 (considering graphs and visual scanning tests used to evaluate a student's reading
program).
69. Id. at 1568.
70. Id. at 1567.
71. Id.; see also Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib., 659 F. Supp. 449, 459-60 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (The stylistic appearance of data cards inserted into computers was not copyrightable
because there was essentially only one way to enter data into a computer. Thus, an idea for entering
data into a computer could only be expressed in a limited number of ways.).
72. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1567-6; see also Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1525-27 (9th Cir. 1993) (computer manufacturing design standards can only be expressed
in a limited number of ways); Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256,
1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (the fundamental activities of the cotton market dictated the various features
of a computer program); Manufacturer's Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995
(D. Conn. 1989) (hardware standards and mechanical specifications can only be expressed in a
limited number of ways).
73. Autoskilll, 793 F. Supp. at 1568.
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Altai analysis for substantial similarity. 74 Ultimately, the similarity of
analysis between Autoskill and Altai indicates judicial acceptance of a
fundamental approach toward determining the scope of copyright protection for computer software. Indeed, one commentator noted that the
Altai analysis was simply a formalization of an "analytical refinement
already employed by a number of courts. '75 In fact, the Altai and
Autoskill tests seem to have been an adoption of Professor Nimmer's
suggestions to substitute Whelan analysis for the abstractions test of
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.;76 to successively filter out unprotected
elements; 77 and finally to compare the remaining core material to determine
7
substantial similarity.
In the Autoskill I analysis, the court first applied a variation of the
Nichols abstractions test for the purpose of extracting idea from expression. 79 First, the court separated the allegedly copied program to its
constituent parts, and then it identified the "levels of abstraction" in
increasing order of generality. 0 After analyzing the program in terms of
the abstractions test, the court held that "the manner in which [the]
Autoskill [program] utilizes ideas and communicates them to students
and teachers in the context of its reading program amounts to expression.'81 Second, the court applied the filtration test to separate the nonprotectable expression from the protectable expression. The court also
used the doctrines of merger and scones 6 faire as "filters" to assist in
the task of extracting the non-protectable expression.8 2 Finally, the court
used the comparison test to determine if the remaining copyrightable core

74. Autoskill Il, 994 F.2d 1476, 1492 (10th Cir. 1993). Recall that the three-step analysis of
Autoskill I was derived independently from the Altai analysis. See supra text accompanying note
61.
75. Miller, supra note 4, at 1003.
76. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir 1930; see also Altai, 775 F. Supp.
at 560 (discussing Professor Nimmer's rejection of the Whelan test for the Nichols abstractions
test); Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1565 ("A basic approach for analyzing the substantial similarity
question regarding computer software has been proposed by Professor Nimmer. 3 NIMMER §
13.13[F]."); Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1490 (stating that a variation of the three-step method of
analysis recommended in Nimmer was recently adopted by the Second Circuit in Altai, 982 F.2d
693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)).
77. Other recent courts have also adopted this filtering approach. See Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
779 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1991; see also 3 N
R, supra note 35, § 13.03[F] n.284 ("The
fact that Autoskill reached a ruling in favor of plaintiff whereas Altai reached a defense judgment
indicated that the successive filtering analysis is designed as a neutral test, favoring neither copyright
owners nor alleged infringers.").
78. 3 N
R, supra note 35, § 13.03[F].
79. The district court found the abstractions test ideal for dissection computer programs because
the test breaks down a computer program in a way that mirrors the typical development of a
program. See Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1491-92.
80. See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l., 740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass.
1990) (discussing Judge Learned Hand's analysis in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
at 121).
81. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 156; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing manner of separating idea from expression by
drawing lines of abstraction); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (analysis by drawing lines of abstraction).
82. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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expression from the Autoskill program was substantially similar to the
NESS program.83 Based on this comparison, the court concluded that
there was a "substantial likelihood" that the NESS program infringed
on the Autoskill program. The comparison phase included lay and expert
85
testimony and exhibits to determine substantial similarity. The court
gave greater weight to testimony comparing the overall function or pedagogical significance of the reading program, such as the manner in
which the program executes certain concepts, than to testimony comparing
the specific logic flow of the two programs.8 6 Thus, by favoring testimony
outlining the significance of a program over the specific details of the
program's execution, Autoskill I provided the courts with an approach
to assess expert testimony in the light the Altai holding.
The opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Autoskill I furthers the notion
of a three-part abstraction-filtration-comparison approach as a test for
substantial similarity. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected NESS's argument that the district court erred in its execution of the abstractions
test from Altai:
[I]t is true that the trial judge's analysis and conclusions here do not
reveal precisely the abstraction analysis outlined in Altai cited by both
NESS and Autoskill. However, we focus on the court's findings and
conclusions, and [the] resulting ruling on protectable areas of expression, rather than the precise method of analysis the judge used ....
simply because of a lack
[Tihe judge's rulings should not be reversed
87
of any particular detail in his analysis.
The court of appeals analyzed the district court's use of the three-step
test for substantial similarity by using the abstraction-filtration-comparison
framework of Altai.88 The court held that the lower court's findings were
not erroneous, thus affirming the preliminary injunction.8 9
Autoskill reflects the recent trend by the courts in developing a test
to address the varying levels of complexity of computer programs and
to promote CONTU's mission of sui generis protection; that is, of applying
existing copyright law to new technology.9 The tests developed in Autoskill, Altai and Whelan exemplify the attempts to develop a flexible
9
approach to substantial similarity analysis for computer programs. '
Another recent case contributing to the substantial similarity test for
computer software is Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc. (Gates

83. Autoskil II, 994 F.2d at 1496-97.
84. Autoskilll, 793 F. Supp. at 1573.
85. Autoskill I, 793 F. Supp. at 1569. Recall that the Altai court left the extent of expert
testimony in a given case to the discretion of the trial court. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
86. AutoskillII, 994 F.2d at 1497-98.
87. Id. at 1494.
88. Id. at 1490-98.
89. Id. at 1499.
90. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
91. See Miller, supra note 4, at 1013 (noting the evolving doctrinal tools applying the ideaexpression dichotomy to computers as a test for substantial similarity).
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Rubber 1).92 The opinions of the district court in Gates Rubber I and
the Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries,
Ltd. (Gates Rubber I)93 demonstrate the evolutionary nature and similar
progression of case law towards a workable test for substantial similarity. 94
The court in Gates Rubber I encountered a factual situation similar to
Autoskill and used the Whelan and Altai tests without reference to the
Autoskill decision. 95 Gates Rubber I, however, used the Whelan and Altai
tests only after it applied the traditional two-pronged similarity analysis
of the "total concept and feel" test.96 The independent analyses of the
Autoskill and Gates Rubber I courts demonstrate the continuing development in copyright jurisprudence towards one test for substantial similarity of computer software.
This notion of a continuing progression culminated in Gates Rubber II.
Due to the chronology of the Tenth Circuit docket, the court in Gates
Rubber II was able to incorporate the reasoning of Autoskill in its
analysis. 97 As a result of Autoskill, Gates Rubber II vacated and remanded
the holding of Gates Rubber I and adopted the abstraction-filtrationcomparison test of Autoskill.98 The court in Gates Rubber II stated:
Determining which elements of a program are protectable is a difficult
task ... [An effective test can be formulated from constitutional
and statutory constraints and guided by existing case law to determine
the scope of copyright infringement. In substantial part, we adopt
the "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test which we previously approved for use in the context of a preliminary injunction ruling in
Autoskill."
Thus, Autoskill has provided a viable method of analysis that enables
courts to better determine whether copyright protected elements of computer software have been infringed.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright policy is meant to balance the interest of protection, characterized by the ensurance of a fair return to authors and inventors to
92. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992).
93. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
94. See AutoskillII, 994 F.2d at 1490 n. 17 (comparing Autoskill Fs use of the three-step method
analysis of Nt
R with the different approach of Gates Rubber !, 798 F. Supp. at 1513, which
used the Whelan analysis in conjunction with the abstractions test).
95. Gates Rubber!, 798 F. Supp. at 1512-19 (Copyright owner of a computer program used to
aid in the selection of replacement industrial belts brought an infringement action seeking permanent
injunction against the use of a competing program. The district court applied the "Altai/Nimmer"
approach, in part, in its analysis.).
96. Id. The district court used the "total concept and feel" test to first compare the computer
software works in their entirety to avoid any underprotection by the narrowing discretion of the
Altai test. Id.
97. The Autoskill11 opinion (May 19, 1993) was issued exactly six months prior to the holding
of Gates Rubber 11 (October 19, 1993). Unfortunately, the district court in Gates Rubber I (August
12, 1992) did not have the opportunity to use this Autoskill opinion.
98. Gates Rubber II, 9 F.3d at 849 (The Gates Rubber H court rejected the district court's
application of the "total concept and feel" test and remanded to comply with the method outlined
in Autoskill opinion.).
99. Gates Rubber II, 9 F.3d at 834 (citing Autoskill II, 994 F.2d at 1487-98).
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thereby establish incentives for development, with the interest of dissemination, to foster learning, progress and development.'0 To secure these
interests, Congress enacted the Copyright Act allowing for the protection
of computer programs as literary works.' 0' Autoskill shows the recent
progress among the federal courts in developing a method of analysis
that allows for copyright protection of computer software. Autoskill's
abstraction-filtration-comparison test provides computer programs with
the flexibility that assures authors the right to their original expression
to build
based on existing copyright law, but also encourages others
10 2
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
Computer programs are better suited for copyright protection rather
than any other form of intellectual property protection because program
development depends on the successive building on the ideas of others.
For example, with the aid of copyright protection, a computer programmer
may design a new program by incorporating existing ideas from word
processing, graphic and spreadsheet software. However, if computer software was afforded patent protection, that same program designer would
not receive any protection because patent law requires the ideas in the
program to be useful, novel and non-obvious. 0 3 Moreover, patent law,
with its long, elaborate and expensive process of examination, would
stifle the explosive growth of the computer software industry by restricting
any incentive for a programmer to design a novel and non-obvious
program. As envisioned by CONTU, computer software is well-suited
for the flexible protection afforded by copyright law. Autoskill's method
of analysis for determining substantial similarity furthers CONTU's vision
that a highly technical field such as computer software can be addressed
by the civil courts using various elements of existing copyright law as
opposed to creating an entirely new branch of law with each emerging
technology.
Autoskill's abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis illustrates the recent development among the federal courts of a general approach for
analysis of substantial similarity for computer software. Thus, Autoskill
furthers CONTU's vision that a rapidly changing and highly complex
technology such as computer software can be addressed by existing statutory copyright law.
RAFAEL V. BACA
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Gates Rubber II, 9 F.3d at 839.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977 & Supp. 1993).
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv, Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1991 Supp.).

